The canonical new Keynesian Phillips Curve has become a standard component of models designed for monetary policy analysis. However, in the basic new Keynesian model, there is no unemployment, all variation in labor input occurs along the intensive hours margin, and the driving variable for in ‡ation depends on workers' marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption. In this paper, we incorporate a theory of unemployment into the new Keynesian theory of in ‡ation and empirically test its implications for in ‡ation dynamics. We show how a traditional Phillips curve linking in ‡ation and unemployment can be derived and how the elasticity of in ‡ation with respect to unemployment depends on structural characteristics of the labor market such as the matching technology that pairs vacancies with unemployed workers. We estimate on US data the Phillips curve generated by the model. While we can reject the baseline new Keynesian Phillips curve in favor of the search-frictions speci…cation, we show it is still too stylized to fully describe the dynamics of …rms'marginal costs. JEL: E52, E58, J64
Introduction
The canonical new Keynesian Phillips curve has become a standard component of models designed for monetary policy analysis. Based on the presence of monopolistic competition among individual …rms, together with the imposition of stagged price setting, the new Keynesian Phillips curve provides a direct link between the underlying structural parameters characterizing the preferences of individual suppliers of labor and the parameters appearing in the Phillips curve.
However, in the basic new Keynesian model, all variation in labor input occurs along the intensive hours margin. In the standard sticky price, ‡exible wage model, the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption move together so that, at all points in time, households are supplying the amount of hours that maximize their utility, given the real wage. There are no unemployed workers; only hours worked per worker vary over the business cycle. As a consequence, the driving variable for in ‡ation depends on workers'marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption. In its neglect of unemployment, the new Keynesian Phillips curve has a distinctly non-Keynesian ‡avor.
In contrast to this standard view of labor input, empirical evidence suggests that, at business cycle frequencies, most variation of labor input occurs at the extensive margin.
In periods of below trend output, employed workers work fewer hours, but also fewer workers are employed. During periods of above trend output, employed workers work longer hours but also more workers are employed. These ‡uctuations in the fraction of workers actually employed re ‡ect ‡uctuations in unemployment.
A growing number of papers have attempted to incorporate the extensive margin and unemployment into new Keynesian models. Examples include Walsh (2003 Walsh ( , 2005 Thomas (2006) , and Gertler and Trigari (2006) . The focus of these earlier contributions has extended from exploring the implications for macro dynamics in calibrated models to the estimation of DSGE models with labor market frictions.
In contrast to this earlier literature, we focus directly on the implications of the labor market speci…cation for the Phillips curve, the connection between the structure of the labor market and the unemployment elasticity of in ‡ation, and empirical tests of the model. To draw a clear distinction with the previous literature, the basic version of our model allows labor to adjust only along the extensive margin. Standard models allow adjustment only along the intensive margin. Trigari (2004) and Thomas (2006) incorporate both margins, but marginal cost (and so in ‡ation) is driven by the intensive margin.
Consequently, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure hours and consumption remains key in their models, just as in standard new Keynesian models. To maintain the focus on labor frictions, we retain the standard Calvo model of price adjustment to model nominal price rigidity. In contrast, Krause and Lubik (2005) depart from the Calvo model of price adjustment in a model of labor frictions by assuming quadratic adjustment costs.
In this case, all …rms adjust each period, an implication that is not consistent with micro evidence on price adjustment.
Our empirical strategy relaxes the assumption that adjustment occurs only on the extensive margin and allows us to test equilibrium conditions that are consistent with a very large family of models incorporating labor market search frictions. While the most recent vintage of US data rejects the new Keynesian Phillips curve as a stable structural relationship, we show that the search-friction Phillips curve can potentially reconcile the new Keynesian model of in ‡ation with the data. Our model predicts that the measure of marginal cost that drives in ‡ation can be written in terms of labor market variables, as in the Keynesian tradition.
The paper closest to ours in motivation is that of Krause, Lopez-Salido, and Lubik (2007) . They too show how labor market frictions a¤ect the de…nition of real marginal cost, the driving force for in ‡ation. While the details of our speci…cation of labor frictions di¤ers from theirs, both papers emphasize that standard measures of real marginal cost are incorrect in the presence of labor market frictions. Our two approaches, however, di¤er in signi…cant ways. First, we employ our framework to derive a linearized version of the new Keynesian Phillips curve that gives in ‡ation explicitly as a function of unemployment.
This allows us to show how the elasticity of in ‡ation with respect to unemployment depends on the structural parameters that characterize the labor market. Second, our empirical strategies di¤er. Krause This allows us to test whether the various components of marginal cost enter in the manner implied by the theory. This decomposition turns out to be important as we …nd that the inclusion of the labor market variables into the Phillips curve signi…cantly a¤ects the estimated impact on in ‡ation of the standard measure of marginal cost typically used in new Keynesian Phillips curves. Finally, our empirical strategy lets us test the theoretical restrictions imposed by the existence of search frictions independently of any assumption on the wage-setting mechanism, the monetary policy rule, the dynamics of exogenous shocks, contrary to full-information estimation strategies, as in Gertler, Sala and Trigari (2007) The rest of the paper is organizes as follows. The basic model is developed in section 2. A log-linearized version of the model is derived and the connections between labor market structure and the Phillip curve are discussed. We see this paper as providing a link between the literature on Phillips curves which related unemployment and in ‡ation 
The model economy
The model consists of households whose utility depends on the consumption of market and home produced goods. Households members are either employed (in a match) or searching for a new match. This means that we do not focus on labor force participation decisions. Households are employed by wholesale goods producing …rms operating in a competitive market for the goods they produce. Wholesale goods are, in turn, purchased by retail …rms who sell to households. The retail goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition. In addition, retail …rms have sticky prices that adjust according to a standard Calvo speci…cation. The modelling strategy of locating labor market frictions in the wholesale sector where prices are ‡exible and locating sticky prices in the retail sector among …rms who do not employ labor provides a convenient separation of the two frictions in the model. A similar approach was adopted in Walsh (2003 Walsh ( , 2005 , Trigari (2005) , and Thomas (2006) . While we incorporate adjustment along both the intensive and extensive margin in the empirical model, we focus the theoretical discussion on a version containing only an extensive margin. This helps to isolate the role of unemployment ‡uctuations on in ‡ation.
Households
Workers can be either employed by wholesale …rms in production activities, receiving a market real wage w t ; or unemployed, earning a …xed amount w u of household production units. We assume that consumption risks are fully pooled; the consumption level of each worker would otherwise depend on its complete employment history. The optimality conditions for workers can be derived from the utility maximization problem of a large representative household with value function
where C t is consumption of each household's member, N t is the fraction of the household's members currently employed, r t are pro…ts from the retail sector, and B t is the amount of riskless nominal bonds held by the household with price equal to p bt . The price of a unit of the consumption basket is P t and is de…ned below. Consumption of market goods supplied by the retail sector is equal to
t is an aggregate of goods purchased from the continuum of retail …rms which produce di¤erentiated …nal goods. The household preferences over the individual …nal goods from …rm j, C(j), are de…ned by the standard Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, so that
, where E m t is total expenditure by the household on consumption good purchases. The intertemporal …rst order conditions yield the standard Euler equation:
where R t is the gross return on an asset paying one unit of consumption aggregate in any state of the world and t is the marginal utility of consumption.
At the start of each period t, N t 1 workers are matched in existing jobs. We assume a fraction (0 < 1) of these matches exogenously terminate. To simplify the analysis, we ignore any endogenous separation. 1 The fraction of the household members who are employed evolves according to
where p t is the probability of a worker …nding a position and
is the fraction of searching workers. Thus, we assume workers displaced at the start of period t have a probability p t of …nding a new job within the period (we think of a quarter as the time period). Note that unemployment as measured after period t hiring is equal to u t 1 N t .
Wholesale …rms and wages
Production by wholesale …rm i is
where Z t is a common, aggregate productivity disturbance with a mean equal to 1 and bounded below by zero. Aggregating (4), Y w t = Z t N t . Wholesale …rms must post vacancies to obtain new employees. They lose existing employees at the rate . To post a vacancy, a wholesale …rms must pay a cost P t for each job posting. Since job postings are homogenous with …nal goods, e¤ectively wholesale …rms solve a static problem symmetric to the household's one: they buy individual …nal goods v t (j) from each j …nal-goods-producing retail …rm so as to minimize total expenditure, given that the production function of a unit of …nal good aggregate v t is given by
Therefore, total expenditures E w on job postings and the demand by wholesale …rms for the …nal goods produced by retail …rm j are given by
where, as before,
Total expenditure on …nal goods by households and wholesale …rms is
where
is total demand for …nal good j. The number of workers available for production at …rm i is given by
where v it is the number of vacancies the …rm posts and q( t ) is the probability of …lling a vacancy. We assume the matching function displays constant returns to scale in vacancies and searching workers, so the probability q is a function of aggregate labor market tightness t , equal to the ratio of aggregate vacancies v t and the aggregate number of workers searching for a job s t ( t v t =s t ). At the aggregate level, workers available for production in period t equal
Wholesale …rms sell their output in a competitive market at the price P w t . The real value of the …rm's output, expressed in terms of time t consumption goods, is P w t Y it =P t = Y it = t , where t = P t =P w t is the markup of retail over wholesale prices. Let it denote …rm i's period t pro…t. The wholesale …rm's problem is to maximize
and the maximization is subject to (4) and (6) and is with respect to Y w it , N it , and v it . Let and ' be the Lagrangian multipliers on (4) and (6) . Then the …rst order conditions for the …rm's problem are
' it q( t ) = 0
The …rst two of these conditions imply
Thus, re ‡ecting the competitive market for the output of wholesale …rms, each such …rm charges the same price and the shadow price of a …lled job is equal across …rms.
Using these results in the last …rst order condition yields
We can rewrite this equation as
The real wage is equal to the marginal product of labor Z t = t , minus the expected cost of hiring the matched worker =q( t ) (a vacancy is matched with probability q( t ), so the number of vacancies to be posted such that expected hires equals one is 1=q( t ); each of which costs ), plus the expected saving the following period of not having to generate a new match, all expressed in units of the …nal good. Note that if = 0, this yields the standard result that w t = Z t = t .
The value of a …lled job is equal to =q( t ). To see this, let V V t and V J t be the value to the …rm of an un…lled vacancy and a …lled job respectively. Then
Free entry implies that V V t = 0, so
Wages
Assume the wage is set in Nash bargaining with the worker's share equal to b. 2 Let V S t be the surplus to the worker of being matched to a …rm relative to not being in a match.
Then the outcome of the wage bargain ensures
where the job posting condition (8) has been used. Since the probability of a searching worker being employed is p t = M t =s t = t q( t ) where M t is the number of new employerworker matches formed in t, the value of the match to the worker can be rewritten as
The term [1 t+1 q( t+1 )] arises since workers who are in a match at time t but who do not survive the exogenous separation hazard at t + 1 may …nd a new match during t + 1. 3 Using (10) in (9),
.
Solving for the wage and substituting the result into (7), one obtains an expression for the real wage:
Substituting (11) into (7), one …nds that the relative price of wholesale goods in terms of retail goods is equal to
summarizes the impact of labor market conditions on the relative price variable.
It is useful to contrast expression (12) with the corresponding expression arising in a new Keynesian model with a Walrasian labor market. The marginal cost faced by a retail …rm is P w t =P t . In a standard new Keynesian model with sticky prices, marginal cost is proportional to the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption (equal to the real wage) and the marginal product of labor. Since the marginal product of labor is equal to Z t , (12) shows how, in a search model of the labor market, the marginal rate of substitution is replaced by a labor-cost expression that depends on the worker's outside productivity, w u , and current and expected future labor market conditions via t and t+1 . If vacancies could be posted costlessly ( = 0), then t = w u as …rms only need to pay workers a wage equal to worker's outside opportunity. When > 0, matches have an asset value and the wage will exceed w u . The wage, and therefore marginal cost, varies with labor market tightness.
Retail …rms
Each retail …rm purchases wholesale output which it converts into a di¤erentiated …nal good sold to households and wholesale …rms. The retail …rms cost minimization problem
where M C n is nominal marginal cost and M C is real marginal cost.
Retail …rms adjust prices according to the Calvo updating model. Each period a …rm can adjust its price with probability 1 !. Since all …rms that adjust their price are identical, they all set the same price. Given M C n t ; the retail …rm chooses P t (j) to maximize
Pt is aggregate demand for the …nal goods basket. The standard pricing equation obtains. These can be written as
and t is the marginal utility of consumption.
Market Clearing
Aggregating the budget constraint (1) over all households yields
Since the wholesale sector is in perfect competition, pro…ts it are zero for each i …rm and
In turn, this implies
Pro…ts in the retail sector are equal to
Since for each good j market clearing implies
, and since the production function of …nal goods is given by Y t (j) = Y w t (j), we can write pro…ts of the retail sector as
Using this result, (16) gives aggregate real spending:
Finally, using the demand for …nal good j in (14), the aggregate resource constraint
Aggregate consumption is given by
A more compact way of rewriting the resource constraint can be obtained by writing (17) and (18) as:
where f t is de…ned as
and measures relative price dispersion across retail …rms.
Equilibrium with sticky prices
When prices are sticky (! > 0), the retail price markup (equivalently, the marginal cost of retail …rms) can vary. The complete set of equilibrium conditions is given by
and a speci…cation for monetary policy.
Log linearization of the Phillips Curve
The standard new Keynesian Phillips Curve is obtained by log-linearizing the price adjustment equation. A comparable Phillips Curve consistent with the model of labor market frictions can also be obtained.
Letx t denote the log deviation of a variable x around its steady-state value, and letx t denote the deviation ofx t around its ‡exible-price equilibrium value. A variable without a time subscript denotes a steady-state value. Using (20), (26) - (28) results in the following expressions for in ‡ation and real marginal cost:
and
The expressions for in ‡ation and the markup illustrate how labor market tightness a¤ects in ‡ation. A rise in labor market tightness reduces the retail price markup, increasing the marginal cost of the retail …rms. This leads to a rise in in ‡ation. Expected future labor market tightness also a¤ects current in ‡ation. For a given^ t , a rise in E t^ t+1
increases the markup and reduces current in ‡ation. 4 It does so through its e¤ects on current wages. Expectations of labor market tightness increase the incentive of …rms to post vacancies. This would normally lead to a rise in current tightness. However, since the coe¢ cient on E t^ t+1 measures the impact on t when^ t remains constant, wages must fall to o¤set the rise in vacancies that would otherwise occur and keep^ t constant.
Finally, there is a cost channel e¤ect in that the real interest rate has a direct impact on t and therefore on in ‡ation. This arises since it is the present discounted value of expected future labor market conditions that matter.
We can further simplify the system of equations to obtain a form more easily comparable to the standard new Keynesian model. Noting thatn t = 1 N N û t and (22) describing the evolution of employment can be expressed
Using (29), the expression for the price markup becomes
where 
Using this expression for the markup in the in ‡ation adjustment equation yields a new
Keynesian Phillips curve expressed in terms of expected future in ‡ation, unemployment, lagged unemployment, expected future unemployment, and the real rate of interest:
Equation ( 
Unemployment and the Phillips Curve
In this section, we investigate the dependence of the unemployment-in ‡ation relationship on labor market frictions. Rewrite (31) as
whereh i = h i . The coe¢ cients on current, lagged, and future unemployment in this equation re ‡ect the impact of unemployment on in ‡ation, holding the real interest rate constant. 5 In our parameterization, the coe¢ cients onû t 1 and E tût+1 are small relative to the coe¢ cient onû t and these coe¢ cients are relatively insensitive to the parameter variations we consider below. Thus, we focus onh 1 in (32).
Parameterization
The baseline values for the model parameters are given in the Table below. All of these are standard in the literature. We impose the Hosios condition by setting b = 1 . By calibrating the steady-state job …nding probability q and the replacement ratio w u =w directly, we can use steady-state conditions to solve for the job posting cost and the reservation wage w u . 6 Given the parameters in the Table, the remaining parameters and 5 The real interest and unemployment are linked by the equilibrium conditions (19) to (25) . Using these conditions, we can obtain an in ‡ation equaton that accounts for the movements of the real rate of interest necessary to be consistent with the path of the unemployment gap -that is, accounts for the cost channel implications of movements inût (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2007) . For the parameterizations discussed in the next subsection, this general equilibrium e¤ect is small and does not a¤ect quantitatively the results. 6 To …nd and w u , assume w u = w, where is the wage replacement rate. Then (11) and (20) can be written as
and these two equations can be jointly solved for and w u . That is,
the steady-state values needed to obtain the log-linear approximation can be calculated. Price adjustment probability 1 ! 0:25
Results
In this section, we explore the e¤ects of the probability of exogenous separation, labor's share of the match surplus, and the job …nding probability on the unemployment elasticity of in ‡ation. from one period to the next, the share of new matches in total employment increases, making employment more sensitive to labor market conditions. Conversely, a given change in unemployment is associated with a smaller change in and, consequentiality, in retail …rm's marginal cost. In ‡ation becomes less sensitive to unemployment. In addition, the role of past labor market conditions falls as match duration declines, and this also reduces the impact of unemployment on expected future marginal cost and in ‡ation.
Under Nash bargaining, the dynamics of unemployment and in ‡ation are a¤ected by the respective bargaining power of workers and …rms. Figure 2 illustrates the impact of labor's share of the match surplus, b, on the responsiveness of in ‡ation to unemployment.
The top panel plotsh 1 as a function of b for two di¤erent values of , while the bottom panels shows the relationship for two di¤erent values of q. As labor's share of the surplus rises, the incentive to create new jobs falls. An expansion of output must be associated with a larger rise in the price of wholesale goods relative to retail goods if wholesale …rms are to increase production. Thus, the marginal cost to the retail …rms, and retail price in ‡ation, becomes more responsive to unemployment movements as b increases.
The last exercise we examine is the impact of the probability of …lling a job on the Phillips curve. In the baseline calibration, we set the steady-state probability of …lling a vacancy equal to 0:7. In absolute value, the impact of unemployment on in ‡ation declines with the steady-state value of q( ), as shown in …gure 3. The steady-state value of a …lled job falls as the steady-state probability of …lling a vacancy rises. The e¤ect a fall in the value of a …lled job has on in ‡ation can be inferred from (12) and (13) . As =q( ) becomes smaller, the marginal cost of labor to wholesale …rms approaches the …xed opportunity wage w u . In the extreme case with = w u , (12) implies that the price markup variable would be constant and equal to Z t =w u . This corresponds to the case of a perfectly elastic supply of labor to wholesale …rms. A demand expansion leads to a fall in unemployment but no increase in the price of wholesale goods relative to retail goods. Thus, as q( ) increases, the marginal cost faced by retail …rms and in ‡ation become less sensitive to labor market conditions. The top panel suggests the e¤ect of q onh 1 is sensitive to the choice of . For any given q, the elasticity of in ‡ation with respect to unemployment is larger in absolute value if is small. The bottom panel similarly shows how the e¤ect of q onh 1 is a¤ected by setting b to a smaller value than in the baseline calibration.
Empirical Estimates of the In ‡ation Equation
The As in the baseline New Keynesian model, the in ‡ation equation is given by
The real marginal cost variable will depend both on the variable cost of employing a labor match in production, and on the asset value of the match, which changes over the business cycle. Equation (7) implies wholesale …rms equate the revenue from entering into one additional productive match M R wholesale t = 1= t to its marginal cost (expressed in levels and in …nal good consumption units), given by
up to a …rst order approximation and, to prepare for the introduction of adjustment along the intensive hours margin, we let LP t = Z t = @Z t N t =@N t denote the marginal product per employee. The expression in brackets in (33) can be interpreted as the marginal cost of entering into a match (in consumption units), that is, the marginal cost of having one productive unit of labor installed. Letting this be denoted by t , wholesale …rms will ensure that the marginal cost of producing one unit of output is equal to the marginal cost of entering into a match divided by the marginal product of the match:
Since the marginal revenue of wholesale …rms is the marginal cost of retail …rms, the forcing variable in the in ‡ation equation can also be obtained by using (34) and the equilibrium condition for wage bargaining, which gives (13), rewritten here for convenience:
There are two advantages in using the de…nition in (33) rather than the one in (35) to estimate the in ‡ation equation. First, (35) imposes a far larger number of theoretical restrictions on the data generating process. For example, the equilibrium condition in (35) requires not only that the …rms'…rst order condition is correctly speci…ed, but also that the household's preferences and the bargaining process appropriately describe the data. As a …rst step, it seems reasonable to test the in ‡ation equation without taking a stand on the household preferences and the wage-setting mechanism. 7 Krause, LopezSalido and Lubik (2007) adopt a similar limited-information approach, but condition their estimates of the Phillips curve to an exogenous parameterization for the elasticity of the matching function, household's relative risk aversion and utility discount factor, the steady-state separation rate.
Second, the functional form of (33) is unchanged if an intensive margin is introduced in the model. The model outlined in the preceding section implicitly assumed a very high elasticity of the household's utility to changes in the amount of per-period hours of labor services supplied in a match. In the limit, the number of hours h t is …xed, with the number of hours normalized to 1 for convenience. Actual business cycle volatility is instead characterized by volatility in both hours and employment. A reasonable description of the data should then admit for the possibility of variable hours. In a model with both intensive and extensive margins, it holds that
where LP t is again marginal productivity per employee, now equal to
Comparing (33) and (36), note that the …rst term in brackets corresponds in the data to the wage bill in either model. The ratio multiplying the term in brackets is the inverse of labor productivity per-employee in both models, since for Y t = Z t N t we have LP t = Z t = Y t =N t and for Y t = Z t N t h t we have LP t = Z t h t = Y t =N t : Therefore, the same empirical relationship in the data is implied whether we employ a model with adjustment only along the extensive margin or a model that allows for adjustment along both extensive and intensive margins. 8 .
The …rst term in (36) can be written as w t h t N t =Y t . This is the labor share measure (or unit labor cost) that enters as the driving variable in the traditional New Keynesian in ‡ation equation (Galí and Gertler 1999) . We label this term M C N K t ; so that we can 7 An log-linearized expression for marginal cost in terms of unemployment can be obtained by using (30) and noting that mct = t . Equation (30) imposes the same theoretical restrictions as are required to obtain (35) . 8 If the production function includes capital and this input can be reallocated across …rms, the term multypling the curly brackets would be 1= Zt(Ntht)
Up to a …rst order approximation, the de…nition of the M Ct would be identical to the one in a model without capital.
write real marginal cost in the presence of labor frictions as
When the cost of posting a vacancy goes to zero (i.e., in the absence of labor market frictions), the marginal cost measure converges to the standard New Keynesian de…nition of real marginal cost.
The equilibrium condition (35) for M C t is instead not invariant to the addition of an intensive margin. When the disutility for hours worked is added to the household's preference speci…cation, the net value of a match for the worker also depends on the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption M RS t : Nash wage bargaining then implies
where V (h t ) is the utility cost of hours worked per employee, and
is the marginal rate of substitution, which is unobservable.
In a model with the extensive and intensive margin, pro…t maximization implies 1= t = M C t is also equal in equilibrium to the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution between hours and consumption for the worker, and the marginal product of labor of an additional hour. While this implies that, as in the New Keynesian model, the driving variable for in ‡ation can be written in terms of the ratio between the marginal product and the marginal rate of substitution, this ratio no longer corresponds to the real wage per unit of output. Hence, marginal cost cannot be measured using unit labor cost data.
Pro…t maximization only requires that at an optimum the cost of producing the marginal unit of output by adding an extra hour of work must be equal to the hourly cost in units of consumptions of producing the marginal unit of output by adding an extra worker:
Estimation Equation
When log-linearizing around the steady state, (37) gives
To take this equation to the data, we …rst need to modify the model to account for long-term productivity growth. Otherwise, as the marginal product of labor increases over time, our speci…cation would imply that search costs in terms of output produced shrinks to zero, and, since output per worker increases steadily over time, conditional on our de…nition of the production function the variable LP t has no steady state.
To incorporate long-run productivity growth, we assume a production function of the form
where " z ; " a are both white noise processes, a is the average growth rate of productivity, and the steady state value of the stationary component of productivity is Z ss = 1. We then assume that the cost of posting a vacancy grows at the same rate as A t so that it is a constant share of output in steady state. The wholesale …rm's …rst order condition is
,
indicates the same quantity as in (37) . This allows us to write real marginal cost as
Log linearizing (39) and using the in ‡ation equation we obtain the following estimation equation:
Reduced Form Estimates
We begin by estimating the reduced form coe¢ cients of the in ‡ation equation. Reduced form estimates are a useful …rst step to verify that the regressors -consistent with the DSGE model -enter signi…cantly into the estimated equation without imposing any theoretical restriction.
The estimation equation is
where " t is a linear combination of " at and the forecast errors for the variables q t+1 and t+1 . This equation is estimated with a two-stage GMM estimator using quarterly US data over the samples 1960 Let z t be a vector of variables within …rms'information set t that are orthogonal to " t . Then (41) implies the orthogonality condition
For 2 = 3 = 4 = 5 = 0, (42) gives the standard Calvo pricing model.
Data
The basic data for in ‡ation t , unit labor cost c mc
and per-employee productivity b lp t are obtained from the BLS statistics for the US nonfarm business sector (NFB).
The estimation requires a time series for the probability of …lling a posted vacancy q t .
We use two alternative measures. Shimer (2005a) builds a series for the job-…nding probability p t using unemployment and short-term unemployment data from the BLS 9 . Given the matching function M t = v t s 1 t the probability of …lling a vacancy is given by
Using the series for labor market tightness t in Shimer (2005a), we obtain a time series for q t up to the …rst quarter of 2004. Following Shimer, the log-deviation b q t is obtained using a slow-moving long-term trend provided by the Hodrick-Prescott …ltered series for the variable, with smoothing parameter = 10 5 :
We build an alternative measure for q t by splicing the JOLTS vacancy data starting in 2000 with the synthetic vacancy rate series estimated by Valletta (2005) starting in 1960 10 . The vacancy series v t is obtained from BLS nonfarm business data for payroll employment P E t using the relationship
Using the BLS NFB data for total unemployment we obtain a series for t :
9 Shimer (2005b) builds a series for the job-…nding probability pt using monthly data from the BLS under the assumption that job o¤ers are available according to a Poisson distribution, and shows that accounting for entry and exit from the labor force does not alter the series signi…cantly. The results are robust to using this alternative pt series.
1 0 Valletta (2005) corrects the help wanted index series for secular movements unrelated to the labor market using the estimated coe¢ cients from a regression of JOLTS data over help-wanted index data for the overlapping period after 2000. The di¤erence between the two series is minimal. A third way to build q t is to use the de…nition
However, the model de…nes the number of employed workers as N t = LF t s t +M t , where LF t is the labor force (normalized to 1). Since this equation implies the labor force is
given by the sum of unemployed workers at the beginning of the period, employed workers at the end of the period, and new matches, it does not correspond to the BLS de…nition of labor force, which is given by LF t = N t + s t ; and cannot be used to compute the model-consistent number of new matches M t .
Our instrument vector z t includes four lags of NFB unit labor costs, the price in ‡ation measure, NFB per-employee labor productivity, vacancy-…lling probability, NFB hourly compensation in ‡ation, HP-…ltered NFB output, federal funds rate, industrial commodities price index, unemployment rate, and the three months-ten year US government bond spread.
Estimates Table 1 reports the estimates using an instrumental variables two-stage GMM estimator and the speci…cation of the orthogonality condition as in equation (42) .
All standard errors are Newey-West corrected to take into account residual serial correlation 12 . We examine three alternative measures of in ‡ation. In all cases, all coe¢ cients are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero with a high con…dence level. The only exception is the signi…cance of the labor productivity coe¢ cient in the case when in ‡ation is measured by the consumer price index. The Hansen J test con…rms that we cannot reject the overidentifying restrictions, although the literature …nds that this test has low power against Table 1, however, it is possible to build an estimate of true marginal cost. Figure 6 shows that in ‡ation is positively correlated with the leads of marginal cost, consistently with the theory, and that this relationship is stable across subsamples.
Yet the estimates in Table 1 present us with a puzzle: they imply that an increase in current unit labor cost leads to a decrease in in ‡ation. Mis-measurement or misspeci…cation can lead to this result. One possibility is that vacancies, used to build the labor market tightness variable, are measured incorrectly. Job vacancies include both positions …lled with unemployed workers (v u ), and positions …lled with job-to-job workers' transitions (v e ). But our model is built to explain only movements in v u ; which are unobservable. The hypothesis that v e is highly correlated with the measure of vacancies implied by the model, and therefore the measured v is a good proxy for v u ; has been shown to be partially inconsistent with available estimates of the matching function (Yashiv, 2006) . The possibility of mis-speci…cation is discussed further below.
A Test of the Cost Channel Equation (40) provides an additional testable implication of the search friction Calvo model. The coe¢ cients on b r t and b q t+1 should be identical.
This restriction is consistently rejected by the data across all speci…cation.
The estimates show that the coe¢ cient 4 on b r t is an order of magnitude larger than the coe¢ cient 5 on b q t+1 : Since both coe¢ cients are estimated with low variance, rejection of the restriction is not surprising. The intuition for this result sheds light on the working of the model. The restriction 4 = 5 obtains since the future expected cost of posting a vacancy is discounted at the real rate of interest. Since the real rate of interest and the probability of …lling a vacancy enter with the same coe¢ cient in the de…nition of M C t , they should have a variance of the same order of magnitude. On the contrary, in the data q t has a variance which is an order of magnitude larger than r t .
Therefore the estimate results in 5 << 4 : A di¤erent model may have a prediction consistent with the di¤erence in variance between r t and q t , but it is not straightforward to build a plausible model with this implication: it would need to have a term q x t =r t with x < 1: That means that the cost of posting a vacancy should depend nonlinearly on the probability of a position being …lled.
Alternatively, the existence of a cost channel can easily justify an estimate for 5 that is much smaller than 4 : If …rms have to pay the factors of production in advance, the term M C N K t in (39) will be multiplied by the cost of borrowing funds (1 + i t ): This provides the necessary degree of freedom in (40) , which can now be rewritten as
In this speci…cation, the coe¢ cient on b i t and E t b q t+1 are not restricted to be equal, while cos t is the share of factor payments that …rms have to pay in advance (see Ravenna and Walsh, 2006) . Table 2 provides estimates of the cost-channel speci…cation. As expected, the only estimate that changes is the coe¢ cient on E t t+1 , now estimated to be smaller as predicted by the theory. The traditional new Keynesian Phillips curve is rejected by the data in favor of the search-friction speci…cation, even after the inclusion of the cost channel.
Lagged In ‡ation Many authors have concluded that at the very least a small but signi…cant backward looking in ‡ation component is consistent with estimates of the new Keynesian Phillips curve, although the inclusion of a lagged in ‡ation term raises a number of econometric issues. Since labor market variables are typically lagging indicators of the business cycle, we would like to test the hypothesis that q t is not signi…cant simply because it proxies for lagged in ‡ation. Table 3 shows the result of the reduced form GMM estimates of the equation:
The speci…cation includes the regressor i t rather than r t to allow explicitly for the existence of a cost channel. The term t 1 enters signi…cantly in the search-friction new Keynesian Phillips curve, but all the other coe¢ cients remain signi…cant. It also enters signi…cantly in the traditional new Keynesian Phillips curve. We conclude that the labor market variables play a role in explaining in ‡ation dynamics that goes beyond serving as a proxy for lagged in ‡ation.
Structural Estimates
Using a non-linear GMM estimator, and restrictions obtained from the theory, it is possible to estimate the structural parameters in (40) . To illustrate the identi…cation issues in the estimation it is convenient to rewrite the in ‡ation equation as:
Identi…cation is possible for at most four parameters. Using the model steady state restrictions it is possible to estimate the discount factor ; the probability of price adjustment
(1 !); the separation rate and the cost of posting a vacancy :
To this end, we make the following assumptions. The steady state value of the marginal cost M C ss is equal to the inverse of the markup ; consistent with the New Keynesian literature, we assume = 1:2: The average growth rate of the permanent technology shock A t is estimated from real GDP data for the NFB sector using the model's restriction:
Over the 1960:1-2007:1 sample the estimate for a is 0:8938: The steady state value of the vacancy-…lling probability q ss is parameterized to a value of 0:7, consistent with available estimates on US data (Blanchard and Gali, 2006) . The coe¢ cient LP ss is equal to h ss Z ss :
We normalize this value to 1 13 . Finally, the coe¢ cient M C N K ss needs to be calibrated. In the presence of search frictions, this coe¢ cient is not equal to 1 as in the standard New Keynesian model. However, the budget constraint and the wholesale sector zero-pro…t condition imply
If the cost of search is small as a share of output -as in most parameterization of the search labor market framework -it holds approximately that
and the ratio M C N K ss =M C ss is approximately equal to unity. Note that in a model with capital, this ratio would be a function of the steady state labor share and the steady state share of employees'total compensation in US national income leads to a slight decrease 1 3 In an economy with capital LPss = Zss
and it is still possible to choose the units of Z such that LPss = 1: 1 4 In a model where capital cannot be instantaneously reallocated across …rms, an additional correction to the in ‡ation equation is needed to allow for the fact that price-setting …rms' marginal cost will be di¤erent from the average cost. Assuming Yt = Zt(Ntht) K in our estimate of , but still signi…cant with a p-value of 6%. Note that choosing an alternative calibration for the vacancy-…lling probability q ss would only a¤ect the estimate of . However, even a very large change in q ss from 0.7 to 0.5 would only results is a fall in the estimated value of from 0.028 to 0.021.
The estimate for has an interesting interpretation. Since A t v t =Y t is the total perperiod cost of search in the economy as a share of output, we can compute the cost of search as : Figure 7 plots the time series for Cost t over the last 40 years. As it turns out, most of its variation derives from the volatility of the vacancy rate, which is far more volatile than output.
Alternative Speci…cations
The unrestricted reduced form estimates presented us with the puzzling implication that a rise in unit labor costs has a negative impact on in ‡ation. Mis-measurement in vacancies could explain this result. At the same time, the estimated model is highly stylized. This section explores some alternative speci…cations that can potentially drive the model closer to the data.
First, consider a model with a time-varying separation rate t . The evidence pointing to the stability of t in US data is strong only for the short period covered by JOLTS data. Estimates for previous periods have shown a higher volatility. An (exogenously) time varying separation rate would add the term
to the estimation equation (40), where is now the steady state value of t 15 .
Second, the cost of vacancy posting need not be constant. A large part of the literature assumes convex costs, though Rotemberg (2005) proposes a model with concave costs where …rms face economies of scale when searching for many positions at one time.
Following Yashiv, (2006) , assume a cost function of the form
Vacancy posting costs are proportional to output, and depend both on the number of posted vacancies (and on labor market tightness since t = v t =N t ) and on the number of hires M t = q t v t . In the extensive margin model, Y t = A t Z t N t and for = 0, = 1, (43) gives t = v t A t Z t , a formulation identical to the one assumed in the model save for the proportionality to stationary technology shocks. Formulations with > 0 give a convex cost function. This model implies that (40) should be augmented with three terms in b t ,
Third, the existence of 'overhead labor'that must be hired regardless of output implies a production function of the form Y = f (Z t ; A t ; (N t N )h t ): Assuming a technology linear in labor, we obtain
Since this speci…cation implies the marginal product of labor di¤ers from the average product, it holds that N t be added to the estimation equation (40) . 16 Fourth, the cost of adjusting the labor input on the intensive margin may be non-zero.
If this cost is convex in hours and is proportional to the number of employees, it will a¤ect the …rst order condition for vacancy posting, given the …rm revenues are decreased by the cost g(h t ; h t 1 )N t : It is easy to show that under very general conditions for the cost function g(:) the estimation equation would be augmented by two terms in b h t and b h t 1 .
When the four alternative speci…cations are estimated with the GMM estimator, the unit labor cost variable still enters signi…cantly in the in ‡ation equation and with a negative coe¢ cient in all cases -even in cases where the added variables turn out to be signi…cant. 1 6 Note that neither the existence of a 'setup cost' per employee, as in Basu and Kimball (1994), nor labor hoarding would modify the estimation equation, since in both cases the production function is of the form Yt = f (Zt; At; Nt(ht h)); implying the log-deviation of marginal labor productivity per employee @Y t @N t is una¤ected.
Conclusions
The relationship between in ‡ation and economic activity has always been at the heart of macroeconomic models used for policymaking, since it summarizes the constraint faced by the central bank when setting monetary policy. While this basic relationship has traditionally taken the form of a Phillips curve relating unemployment and in ‡ation, modern macroeconomic theory based on dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models relies on Walrasian labor markets, where involuntary unemployment is ruled out by assumption.
The new Keynesian paradigm assumes all variation in labor input occurs along the intensive hours margin, and the driving variable for in ‡ation depends on workers'marginal rates of substitution between leisure and consumption. This paper incorporates a search-friction model of the labor market into a sticky-price new Keynesian model of economic activity. A number of simplifying assumptions allow us to derive an equilibrium relationship between in ‡ation and labor market variablesspeci…cally, unemployment -providing a microfoundation for the Phillips curve empirical relationship that has been investigated by a large literature over the last …fty years. Our model allows us to assess the dependence of the unemployment elasticity of in ‡ation on the structure of the labor market. In addition, we obtain a Phillips Curve that nests the standard new Keynesian Phillips curve and that allows us to empirically test the model.
In our model the driving variable for in ‡ation is the …rm's marginal cost inclusive of the search cost to hire a worker. The Phillips curve relates the quasi-di¤erence between in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation to lagged, current, and future values of unemployment, to the real interest rate and to per-employee productivity. The in ‡ation elasticity to unemployment is decreasing in the probability of a …rm-worker match separating, and in the probability of a vacancy being …lled, while it is increasing in labor's bargaining power. Therefore the search-friction Phillips curve has the potential to explain crosscountry di¤erences in the dynamics of in ‡ation as a consequence of alternative structural characteristics of the labor market Our empirical strategy lets us test a version of the Phillips curve that is consistent with a very large family of models incorporating labor market search frictions, such as models with both an extensive and an intensive margin. While the most recent vintage of US data rejects the new Keynesian Phillips curve as a stable structural relationship, we show that the search-friction Phillips curve can potentially reconcile the new Keynesian model of in ‡ation with the data. Using a GMM estimator we show that the baseline new Keynesian Phillips curve, both in its forward-looking, hybrid and cost-channel formulations, is consistently rejected in favor of our model of the Phillips curve.
Our model provides a straightforward test of the relevance of search frictions for macroeconomic volatility, and our structural estimates show that the total per-period cost of search in the US economy since 1960 has been of the order of 0:10% of non nonfarm business sector output. At the same time, the reduced-form estimation allows testing of key theoretical restrictions implied by the search and matching framework.
The theoretical restriction that unit labor costs have a positive impact on in ‡ation is not supported by the data -even when using alternative speci…cations of the search friction model. This result is especially puzzling since our test equation is consistent with a very large family of models incorporating labor market search frictions. A likely explanation is that the available data on labor compensation and vacancies may not accurately measure the variables entering the …rms'pricing decisions (Bernanke, 2007 , Yashiv, 2006 . In summary, while the search friction Calvo model we present provides a better …t to the data than the baseline New Keynesian model, it is still too stylized to fully describe the dynamics of …rms' marginal costs. Additional propagation mechanisms, such as procyclical labor e¤ort, endogenous separations, cost of …ring and job to job transitions are promising avenues to explore.
Appendix

Wage determination
Consider a comparison of the outcomes from the worker in making a match versus not making one. The value of the match is the wage plus the expected value of entering the following period with a job:
since an employed worker survives the exogenous separation process and remains in a match with probably 1 , becomes unemployed with probability but immediately …nds another job with probability t+1 q( t+1 ), or becomes unemployed with probability but does not …nd a new match.
The value of not making a match is the alternative wage plus the expected value of entering the following period unemployed:
. The value of being unemployed is
Combining these results,
which is (10) of the text. Instruments set includes four lags of NFB unit labor costs, the price in ‡ation measure, NFB per-employee labor productivity, vacancy-…lling probability, NFB hourly compensation in ‡ation, HP-…ltered NFB output, federal funds rate, industrial commodities price index, unemployment rate, and the three months-ten year US government bond spread. Data source: Shimer (2006), Valletta (2005) , BLS, BEA. Table 4 .
